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The Information Content of Institutional Trades on the London 
Stock Exchange  
I.  Introduction 
Previous studies document a significant impact of block trades on the 
equilibrium share prices but report that markets react differently to buy and sell 
orders. Starting with Kraus and Stoll (1972), a number of studies show that block 
purchases have a larger permanent price impact than block sales as prices increase 
(decrease) after a buy (sell) transaction, they remain high after the buys but they 
revert after the sells (e.g., Keim and Madhavan (1996), Gemmill (1996)). Similar 
results are documented for institutional trades (Chan and Lakonishok (1993)) and for 
institutional trade packages (Chan and Lakonishok (1995)). This puzzle is referred to 
in the literature as the permanent price impact asymmetry. 
A number of hypotheses are tested in the literature to account for this impact, 
including the price pressure hypothesis (e.g., Kraus and Stoll (1972)), the imperfect 
substitution hypothesis (e.g., Scholes (1972)) and the information hypothesis (e.g., 
Kraus and Stoll (1972), Scholes (1972), and Mikkelson and Partch (1985)). The first 
two hypotheses posit that if a stock does not have sufficiently close substitutes, the 
excess demand and supply curves for its shares will not be perfectly elastic, and the 
block trade will result in a permanent price impact. However, these hypotheses do not 
explain fully why the permanent price impact should depend on whether the initiator 
of the trade is a seller or a buyer. In contrast, the information hypothesis suggests that 
the trading strategy of informed traders makes the buy orders convey more 
information than the sell orders. For example, Keim and Madhavan (1996) argue that 
purchases are more likely to be based on private information because they create new 
long term positions. Chan and Lakonishok (1993) maintain that buy trades are more 
likely to convey positive firm specific news because they imply a choice of one 
security amongst all the stocks in the market. Saar (2001) develops a model in which 
the price impact corresponds to the change in market expectations of the true value of 
the stock. Chiyachantana, Jain, Jiang and Wood (2004) claim that in bullish markets 
the suppliers of liquidity will not push down prices following a sell order as it is easy 
to find a buyer, while in bearish markets institutions have to offer discounts to find 
buyers for their sell orders, resulting in buys (sells) having a bigger and permanent 
price impact in bullish (bearish) markets. 
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In this paper we contribute to the literature by relating the asymmetric price 
response of buy and sell trades to a combination of two types of information released 
by companies when institutions trade: the size of the trade and the ownership level 
that results from the trade. The combination of these two types of information is likely 
to drive the impact of the trade on share prices. This alternative hypothesis implies 
that large buy trades undertaken by blockholders are expected to result in an increase 
in prices because they are likely to convey to the market private information and/or 
monitoring potentialities. Similarly, large sell trades that result in a significant 
decrease in post-trade ownership are likely to lead to a negative price reaction as the 
trade will signal negative information about the company and a reduction in the 
degree of potential monitoring. In contrast, as argued by Keim and Madhavan (1996) 
and Chan and Lakonishok (1993), small trades that result in a marginal change in 
ownership will not be informative as they are likely to be driven by liquidity reasons 
or encouraged by the brokers to accumulate long inventory positions for smaller price 
concessions. We also investigate the extent to which the information signaled to the 
market from both buy and sell trades depends on the type of investor initiating the 
trade and the frequency of their trading, after accounting for the trade complexity and 
volatility effects. 
The paper makes several contributions to the literature on institutional trading 
behaviour and price impact. First, we undertake an out-of-sample test of the previous 
evidence which is predominantly US-based using data on institutional trading in the 
UK. Second, unlike most previous studies that relied mainly on quarterly ownership 
data to compute changes in institutional holdings, we construct a unique dataset that 
includes all daily institutional block trading activity in the London Stock Exchange 
(LSE) from 1993 to 1999. This data is compiled from the announcements made by 
companies in the Regulatory News Services (RNS) where they have to disclose to the 
market the name of any investor who holds a minimum of three per cent of the 
outstanding shares and any change in this holding when the trade is made. This 
dataset leads us to focus mainly on trades undertaken by large institutional investors 
who are likely to possess private information and monitoring capabilities. Third, we 
split these institutions into various categories including, fund managers, insurance 
companies, banks, investment trusts (open-end funds), industrial and commercial 
companies, overseas investors, and internally-managed occupational pension funds. 
This categorization allows us (i) to overcome the difficulties encountered in previous 
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studies that used high frequency data, such as the New York Stock Exchange Trade 
and Quotations (TAQ) database, in classifying the direction of the trade and the 
identity of the trader (e.g., Finucane (2000), and Lee and Radhankrishna (2000)), (ii) 
to assess whether institutional investors are homogeneous in their trading pattern, and 
(iii) to document whether these institutions have similar affects on the share prices of 
the companies in which they trade. Fourth, we provide some evidence on the identity 
of the institutional investor who is likely to be an informed trader by analyzing share 
price performance after the trade, and by testing the hypothesis of Brennan and Cao 
(1996) that informed traders are contrarians while non-informed are trend followers. 
Finally, we expand the literature by providing an alternative explanation for the 
asymmetric price response to buys and sells based on a combination of the proportion 
of shares traded with the ownership of the trader. 
We identify a total of 19,166 institutional trades split into 9,843 (51%) buy 
and 9,323 (49%) sell trades in 976 UK companies undertaken by 1,504 institutional 
investors. This dataset has resulted in a smaller frequency of the trades but larger 
average trade size than previous studies that used high frequency data. The first 
results indicate that the institutional investors in the sample differ in their frequency 
of trading, with fund managers accounting for 40% of the total trades, and that 74% of 
transactions amount to less than 3% of the outstanding equity, with 82% for the buy 
and 66% for the sell trades.  
The standard event study methodology is used to compute the abnormal 
returns around the announcement date (day 0) of the trade as disclosed in the RNS by 
companies. For the sample as a whole, the abnormal returns in the pre-event period 
are negative for the buy and positive for the sell trades, while, in the post-
announcement period, the abnormal returns following both buy and sell transactions 
are not statistically significant. On the announcement date, the market reacts 
positively to both the buy and sell trades, but the abnormal returns for the buys are 
statistically higher than those of the sales. The results did not change significantly 
when we exclude the confounding events, i.e., events where two large trades with 
different directions occur at the same time and cancel out any price reaction. 
However, when the size of the trade and the new level of ownership of the trader are 
taken into account, the results show a clearer share price behaviour around the trades. 
The market reacts strongly when the buy trade is large and results in large block 
ownership. In addition these large buy trades are preceded by a significant drop in 
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share prices in the pre-announcement period and they result in significant positive 
cumulative abnormal returns forty days after the trade. The large sell trades that 
decrease significantly the level of the trader’s stock ownership result in insignificant 
abnormal returns on the announcement date and in negative and significant abnormal 
returns in the post-event period. These results suggest that large buy and sell trades 
convey some information to the market, but since prices rise after the buys and fall 
after the sells, the findings do not provide support for the asymmetric price response 
hypothesis.  
These results are further investigated by analyzing the trading patterns of each 
category of institutional investor in the sample and the share price impact that follows 
the trades. We find that fund managers, the largest active traders in our sample, buy 
after a significant drop in share prices (CAR-40,-2 = -11.39%), and their trades result in 
significant share price increases on the announcement date (CAR-1,+1 = +1.17%) and 
in the post-event period (CAR+2,+40 = +2.33%). In contrast, their large sales are 
preceded by a significant price increase (CAR-40,-2 = +1.61%) and their trades result in 
negative abnormal returns on the announcement date (CAR-1,+1 = -0.83%) and in the 
post-event period (CAR+2,+40 = -2.39%). The magnitude of the abnormal returns may 
not be economically large but the pattern of the abnormal returns is consistent with 
Brennan and Cao (1996) who suggest that investors who adopt contrarian strategies 
by selling (buying) after a price rise (decline) are likely to be informed. The trades of 
the fund managers do provide information to the market about the future performance 
of the firms in which they trade, as prices continue to rise (decline) after the buy (sell) 
trade. The results could also indicate that the market compounds the potential 
monitoring role of these institutional investors. In this case, the buy trades indicate 
that, by the sheer size of the funds invested, the fund managers are expected to 
monitor and lead the firm to a better performance, while the sell trades signal that the 
fund managers chose an exit rather than a monitoring strategy. 
The results for the buy trades undertaken by insurance companies and 
investment trusts are relatively similar to the buy transactions of fund managers. 
However, the sell trades of these last two institutions do not lead to a decline in prices 
in the post-event period, providing support for the asymmetric price response 
hypothesis. For the remaining investors and for all small trades, the trading is 
relatively random with no strong and consistent timing and/or information content. 
Finally, we find that the announcement date abnormal returns of the sell trades are not 
 6
negative, except for the large sell trades of the fund managers. These results could be 
related to the possibility that share prices may rebound immediately after one or two 
trades, as shown by Gemmill (1996), or that the suppliers of liquidity are not pushing 
prices down when they face a selling interest, as argued by Chiyachantan et al (2004), 
as most of our sample period is characterized by a bullish market.  
The regression results provide some further support for the information 
hypothesis of the buy trades. After accounting for size, trade complexity, type of 
trading institution, and volatility effects in the regression model, the post-event 
abnormal returns are found to be positively related to the buy trades undertaken by 
large investors. For the sell trades, the results are not too strong. The coefficient of the 
decrease in ownership following the sell trade is negative and significant. However, 
the relationship between these abnormal returns and the type of trader is mixed. On 
the announcement dates, none of the coefficients of the trader type is significant and 
in the post-event period not all the coefficients of the trader type are negative. These 
results suggest that the market reacts differently to buy and sell trades.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II summarises the theoretical 
background. Section III describes the data and methodology. Section IV presents the 
empirical findings. Section V concludes.  
II. Theoretical Background 
Normally, block trades should have no effect on the firm value because there 
is a buyer for every seller. Given that investors are rational and informed decision-
makers, their trades will not be informative about the firm’s prospects, and, thus, will 
not affect the equilibrium prices. However, various studies show that block trades 
result is significant price impacts. They also report puzzling results as the buy trades 
have a larger permanent price impact than the sell transactions, because, while prices 
go up on buys and down on sells, they remain high after the buys but they revert after 
the sales, creating a permanent price asymmetry (e.g., Ball and Finn (1989), Chan and 
Lakonishok (1993, 1995), Kraus and Stoll (1972), and Keim and Madhavan (1996)). 
The literature has identified three main sources of the price impact of trading. 
First, the price pressure or the short-run liquidity hypothesis suggests that the sales or 
purchases of large volumes of stock would be impossible to achieve without moving 
the markets because the demand curve for shares is downward sloping and the seller 
has to offer a “sweetener” to convince investors to buy the additional shares now 
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available in the market (e.g., Scholes (1972)). Holthausen, Leftwich and Mayers 
(1987) relate the price impact to the price concession given by the seller of a large 
block which includes compensation for the search, and the inventory costs which 
include a risk premium. Similarly, an investor who initiates the purchase of a large 
block may need to pay a premium to account for the difficulty in finding sufficient 
number of sellers willing to immediately part with their holding. This hypothesis 
predicts a temporary price effect and a quick return of prices to their equilibrium level 
(e.g., Kraus and Stoll (1972), Ho and Stoll (1981)). Empirically, this “rebound” is 
observed within 15 minutes after the transaction (Dann, Mayers and Raab (1977)) or 
within one or two trades (Gemmill (1996)).  
A related view is the imperfect substitution hypothesis which considers that if 
a particular asset promises higher expected returns simply because of an increased 
availability in the market, the arbitrage opportunity will quickly be dissipated by 
market participants, and the price will move accordingly. Scholes (1972) argues that 
since assets are substitutes in investor portfolios, the price effects of the buy and sell 
trades must be very small. However, if there are insufficient close substitutes for a 
particular firm’s stock, a seller might be faced with a downward-sloping demand 
curve, which will necessitate a discount in stock price for the transaction to take place. 
Similarly, a buyer might be faced with an upward-sloping supply curve requiring a 
premium for a large transaction to occur. This hypothesis predicts a permanent price 
effect1 or at least a slower price ‘rebound’ than that of the price pressure hypothesis. 
These two hypotheses do not, however, explain why the permanent price impact 
should depend on whether a seller or a buyer initiates the trade. 
Lastly, the information hypothesis suggests that the additional information 
signalled by the trade will move prices and that large trades will have more 
information because of the significant information costs necessary to beat the market. 
In contrast, small trades will not affect prices because they are carried out mainly for 
portfolio-adjustment purposes. Thus, a purchase (sale) of a large block of shares is 
likely to cause an upward (downward) pressure on the stock price that is not just a 
‘sweetener’ but rather a permanent price adjustment which will take place even when 
there are close substitutes to the firm’s stock, resulting in perfectly elastic demand 
curves (Kraus and Stoll (1972), Scholes (1972), Mikkelson and Partch (1985)). 
Empirically, Kraus and Stoll (1972) find information effect for buys but not for sells. 
Keim and Madhavan (1996) relate this asymmetric price response to the possibility 
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that buys are likely to be based on private information as they create long positions. 
Chan and Lakonishok (1993) suggest that the choice of one security amongst all the 
stocks in the market will drive the price impact of the buy trades. Saar (2001) 
develops a model in which the price impact corresponds to the change in market 
expectations of the true value of the stock and Chiyachantana et al (2004) suggests 
that the asymmetric price impact depends on the overall stock market conditions.  
In this paper we extent this literature by testing an alternative hypothesis that 
emanates from the two types of information disclosed by companies when the trade is 
reported: the size of the trade and the ownership level that results from the trade. The 
combination of these two types of information is likely to indicate that the market 
reaction to institutional trades depends on the ability of the trader to acquire private 
information and/or to monitor companies in which they trade.2 In line with the 
information hypothesis, the monitoring hypothesis predicts stock price increase 
(decrease) following buy (sell) transactions. However, previous studies argue that 
ownership should be high enough so that the potential benefits of monitoring are in 
excess of the costs.3 We measure this ability by the post-trade level of ownership of 
the trader. The actual size of the trade, given the level of ownership, will indicate to 
the market whether the trade is driven by private information/monitoring or liquidity. 
Thus, a large buy trade undertaken by an institutional investor who holds a large stake 
is likely to result in positive abnormal returns on the announcement and post-event 
dates to reflect the potential monitoring and the private information. In contrast, a 
large block of shares sold by a large shareholder who ends up with a low ownership 
will result in negative event and post-event period abnormal returns to reflect the bad 
news and the end of the (potential) monitoring activity. 
III. Data and Methodology 
The sample includes all institutional block trades in the London Stock 
Exchange (LSE) reported to the Regulatory News Service (RNS) division of the 
Company Announcements Office (CAO) from January 1993 to December 1999. The 
disclosure requirement originates from the Continuing Obligations Section of the LSE 
Listing Rules (Yellow Book) which makes reference to the Companies Act 1985 for 
the specific percentage change figures to be used as guidelines. As from June 1990, 
firms have to report any beneficial ownership of 3% or more in their annual accounts 
and any change from this cut-off point is disclosed without delay in the RNS.  
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Extel Financial-Company Research compiles this information, as news item 
entitled ‘Shareholding in Company’, in the exact format that it was disseminated by 
the RNS to all listed and member firms on-line real-time. The news items are given as 
text (a short paragraph) including the date of the announcement, the name of the 
shareholder and the new percentage of share stake held after the trade. We include in 
our sample any change from the minimum cut-off point of 3% as disclosed by 
companies. The data is rearranged and thoroughly checked for errors. After 
eliminating all events with unavailable or incomplete data for the full estimation cum 
event windows, the final sample consists of 19,166 events for 976 companies 
(including currently extinct companies) and 1,504 institutional investors. This 
procedure of collecting the data has resulted in a relatively smaller sample than 
previous studies (e.g., Gemmill (1996)) that use high-frequency data.4 
We analyze our data further by identifying for each trade the identity of the 
trader5 and then classify each trader into seven categories: fund managers, insurance 
companies, banks, investment trusts (open-end funds), industrial and commercial 
companies, overseas investors, and internally-managed occupational pension funds. 
For example, we include in the internally-managed occupational pension funds any 
known pension funds, such as Hermes, and any institutional trader’s name that 
includes the keywords pension, pension funds, retirement, superannuation and 
superannuation schemes. Investors that are not in these seven categories are classified 
into “Other Financial Institutions”. This categorization allows us to overcome the 
difficulties encountered in previous studies that used stock exchanges trade by trade 
data (e.g., the New York Stock Exchange Trade and Quotations (TAQ) database) as 
we are able to identify the direction of the trade and the identity of the trader, and also 
to assess whether institutional investors are homogeneous in their trading activity and 
whether they affect share prices of the company in which they trade in the same way.  
The market model (Brown and Warner (1985)) with the parameters (α and β) 
calculated over the estimation period [-290,-41], is used to compute the abnormal 
returns over the event period covers -40 to +40 days where day 0 is the announcement 
date of the trade. We use the company share prices adjusted for capital changes and 
dividends to calculate the log security i’s returns (Ri), the FTSE-All Share Index 
which covers about 800 UK quoted companies to compute the market return (Rm) and 
the Scholes and Williams (1977) procedure to correct for non-synchronous trading.  
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IV. Empirical Results 
A.  Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of the sample. The average size of a 
trade, as measured by the percentage of the number of shares outstanding, is 2.72% 
and the average value is £14.76m. We find no evidence of clustering of our trades in a 
particular year.6 The size of the trades in our sample is relatively similar to that 
reported by Wahal (1996) but larger than Chan and Lakonishok (1995) who find that 
institutions break up their trades into small blocks and that under one-fifth of 
institutional buy orders by value are completed in one day but more than half of 
purchases take four days or longer.  
Panel B and Panel C show that the average size of sell trades of 3.10% is 
greater than the 2.36% for the buy transactions (p of differences in means = 0.00). 
Similar results are observed for the medians (1.33% vs. 1.15%, p = 0.00) and for the 
trade values (£16.56m vs. £12.96m, p = 0.00). Accordingly, the average proportion of 
shares held immediately after the sell trade of 7.72% is smaller than the 12.13% for 
buy trades (p = 0.00). There is no strong difference between the market capitalizations 
of companies that experienced the buy compared to those that had sell transactions.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
The distribution of trades across different types of institutional investors, 
reported in Table 2, shows that Fund Managers are by far the largest category of 
traders with 41% of all buy trades (4,043 out of 9,843) and 39% (3,613 out of 9,323) 
of all the sell trades. They are followed by Insurance Companies and Overseas 
Institutions. Internally-managed occupational pension funds, the largest shareholder 
category in the UK (Faccio and Lasfer (2000)), represent only 4% of the total trades, 
suggesting that pension funds are not active traders, but long-term passive investors.7  
These trades are split into different size categories by the proportion of share 
capital traded. Table 2 shows that 82% of all buys (8,050 out of 9,843) and 66% of all 
sells (6,118 out of 9,323) fall into the less than 3% category. The distribution of these 
trade categories by type of institutional investor shows relatively similar tendency. 
The trades in which more than 20% of share capital changes hands are rare (only 
0.4% of all buy and 0.5% of all sell trades). We note that most of these large trades 
above 20% of outstanding shares are undertaken by fund managers, overseas 
institutions, industrial and commercial companies and other institutional investors. 
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[Insert Table 2 about here] 
B.  Abnormal Returns 
Table 3, Panel A., provides a summary of the behavior of share prices around 
the announcement of the trades for the sample as a whole. The results indicate that on 
the event dates (CAR-1,+1) share prices of both buy and sell orders increase 
significantly. However, the abnormal returns of 0.65% on the buy trades are 
statistically higher that the 0.30% abnormal returns of the sell trades (t of differences 
in means is -5.72). In the pre-event period the trends in abnormal returns are different: 
for the buy orders the CAR-40,-2 are negative and significant (-0.41%, t = -1.99) and 
for the sell trades they are positive and significant (+3.03%, t = 6.67). The difference 
between the mean abnormal returns of the buy and sell orders is statistically 
significant (t = -11.43). The last column shows that the post-event abnormal returns 
(CAR+2,+40 ) are not significant for both the sell and buy trades. Overall, these results 
suggest that, on average, institutional investors follow contrarian strategies in their 
buy and sell trades but the findings do not provide strong support for the information 
hypothesis which predicts that the abnormal returns should be positive (negative) on 
the announcement date and in the post-event period following the buy (sell) trades. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
These results are not fully consistent with the previous findings. For example, 
Chan and Lakonishok (1995) report negative CARs just before the commencement of 
the buy trade package8, cutting the x-axis (0%) half-way into the trade package and 
yielding positive CARs afterwards. Although, our cumulative abnormal returns 
appear to follow the trend documented by Chan and Lakonishok (1995), the post-buy 
trades are not significant. However, for the sell trades, our results are somehow 
similar to the findings of Chan and Lakonishok (1995) who report price run-up to day 
0, although of a much smaller magnitude (0.37% compared to our results of 3.03%). 
They interpret this finding as consistent with prior evidence (Lakonishok and Smidt 
(1987)) that “volume (and hence both buying and selling activity) tends to rise after 
increases in the stock price” (Chan and Lakonishok (1995), p.1158). However, they 
find a drop in CARs at the start of a sell package which recovers on the last day of the 
package. This rapid rebound seems to be in support of the price pressure hypothesis. 
In contrast, we find a slower fluctuation which may provide some support for the 
imperfect substitution hypothesis. Our results are also not consistent with Grinblatt, 
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Titman and Wermers (1995) who find that institutions are momentum investors and 
tend to follow past prices. Finally, we find no downward pressure on prices in the 
post-event period. These results are consistent with Chan and Lakonishok (1993) who 
argue that money managers might be involved in strategic trading in a way that will 
minimize the short-run liquidity and information effects. This possibility is 
investigated further by analyzing the impact of confounding events. 
C.  Confounding Events 
If investors trade to minimize the short-run liquidity and information effects, 
they would split their trades into small amounts, although this may be costly. We test 
this possibility by excluding all trades that occurred over the 7-day period [-3 to +3] 
around the date of the first announcement (day 0). The overall results, reported in 
Table 3, Panel B, are similar to those reported in Panel A. Share prices decrease by -
1.16% before the buy trade, increase by 0.48% on the announcement date, and then 
they revert by decreasing significantly by -0.70% in the post-event period. These 
results suggest that the information content of the buy trade is observed only on the 
announcement date. For the sell trades, share prices increase by 1.69% from day –40 
to day 0, carry on increasing (but not significantly) by 0.09% in the event period [-1, 
+1] and in the post-event period they drift by 0.49% and become significant. Overall, 
these results do not provide enough evidence to suggest that confounding events drive 
the abnormal performance.9  
D.  Impact of the trade size 
Easley and O’Hara (1987) and Glosten (1989) report that the price impact of a 
trade is affected by the size of the transaction. In addition, the size of the transaction 
can be used as a proxy for the information conveyed by the trade. Kyle (1985), in his 
rational expectations model, hypothesises that informed traders are more likely to 
maximise their trading profits by unfolding their trades gradually in the presence of 
liquidity (noise) traders. We test this hypothesis by analysing the abnormal returns of 
trades classified by size. We use various measures of size. First we classify our trades 
into small and large trades on the basis of the median, then, we use the average values 
and finally the following size categories: less than 3%, 3%-5%, 5%-10%, 10%-15%, 
15%-20% and greater than 20%. The results are mixed and in most cases not 
statistically significant. We do not report these results and we think that they are 
 13
driven by the possibility that trade size measured in terms of percentage of shares 
traded is not a good proxy for size when testing the information hypothesis.  
Instead, we test the hypothesis that the size of the trade as well as that of the 
after-trade ownership affect the market reaction to the buy and sell trades. We exclude 
all cases without data on ownership. The final sample includes a total of 11,872 split 
into 6,077 buys and 5,795 sales. We sort our buy trades first by size of the trade and 
then by the subsequent ownership level by descending order. We, then, split the 
ranked sample into four groups. The top group is referred to as the large trade group 
and includes the largest trades by size and the largest ownership. The last group is 
referred to as the small trade group and includes the smallest trade by size and 
resulting ownership levels. We do the same for the sell trades except that we rank the 
trades by descending order and the ownership by ascending order. The top group is 
referred to as large trade group and includes large trades that resulted in small 
ownership. The bottom group is referred to as the small trade group which includes 
small trades that had marginal effect on the ownership level.  
The findings are reported in Table 3, Panel C. For the large buy trades, we find 
larger and significant announcement date abnormal returns of 1.14%. In the pre- and 
post-event periods, the abnormal returns of -6.22% and 1.53%, respectively, are 
statistically significant. On the announcement dates, share prices increase by 1.14%. 
These results indicate that large buy trades that result in high ownership are 
undertaken after a significant price drop and their positive price impact expands 
beyond the announcement date, suggesting permanent price impact resulting from 
information and/or monitoring effects. In contrast, small buy trades are undertaken 
after a run-up in share prices and result in positive announcement date abnormal 
returns of 0.16% and negative abnormal returns of -2.12% in the post-event period. 
Although these results for the sell trades are not consistent with our hypothesis, the 
differences in mean abnormal returns between large and small trades are statistically 
significant; indicating that these two types of trades follow different patterns and have 
different effects on the announcement date abnormal stock price performance.  
The small sell trades are preceded by positive abnormal returns of 4.65% and 
result in positive abnormal returns of 0.44% on the announcement dates. In the post-
event period the abnormal returns are not statistically significant. For the large sell 
trades the announcement date abnormal returns are 0.21%, not statistically significant. 
These results are not consistent with our hypothesis as they indicate that the sell trades 
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do not provide negative information to the market. However, for the large sell trades, 
the post-event period abnormal returns are negative and significant, suggesting that 
large sell trades that result in low ownership are likely to be driven by private 
information. These large sell trades are also undertaken after significant price run-ups. 
The differences in mean abnormal returns in the pre- and post-event periods between 
large and small trades are significant.    
Overall, these results indicate that the large trades provide information to the 
market, and as argued by Brennan and Cao (1996), they are likely to be undertaken by 
informed investors because they are based on contrarian strategies. In the post-event 
period share prices increase (decrease) after the buy (sell) trades, suggesting that our 
results are not consistent with the asymmetric price response hypothesis. Finally, the 
behavior of share prices in the pre-announcement period implies that large price 
declines are likely to trigger only large buy trades while large price run-ups lead 
equally to small buy as well as large and small sell trades.  
We test for the possibility that the significant post-announcement returns are 
driven by the short-run liquidity effects by computing the cumulative abnormal 
returns over [+31 to +40] period. We find these CARs to amount to 0.24 percent for 
large buys and –0.38 percent for large sells, both of which are statistically significant 
at the 1 percent level and the difference in means between these two CARs is 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level. For small sells and small buys however, 
the picture is not very clear. This could be explained by the fact that we are unable to 
identify whether these small trades are performed merely for portfolio rebalancing 
purposes or as part of a larger trade. For example, Chan and Lakonishok (1993) find 
that the size of a typical trade is surprisingly small although their sample of 
transactions comes from large money managers. They argue that large money 
managers “trade strategically to reduce the influence of short-run liquidity costs or 
information effects” (p.177). We test for robustness of these results by splitting our 
sample into small and large trades using the 3% level.10 The results are qualitatively 
similar to those reported in Table 3, Panel C. For example, we find statistically 
significant post announcement CARs of 1.60% for buys (–1.64% for sales) for trades 
greater than 3% which lead to large (small) new ownership levels. Thus, the evidence 
in support of the information hypothesis does not depend on alternative specifications 
to capture the trade size effect. 
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E.  Impact of trader identity  
Another question that needs to be asked is whether the identity of the trader 
has a bearing on our results. Previous empirical studies show that investors do not 
trade homogeneously (e.g., Badrinath and Wahal, (2002)). They may also have 
different objectives in their trades and different monitoring roles (e.g., Brickley, Lease 
and Smith (1988, 1994), and Bethel et al. (1998)). Scholes (1972) explains that the 
information effect of a large block transaction will depend on the identity of the buyer 
or the seller since certain categories of investors are expected to have more 
information about the company than others. A detailed analysis of the different 
trading styles and trading strategies adopted by different institutional investors, along 
with the price impact of such diverse trading behaviour is beyond the scope of this 
paper. Instead, this section tries to determine whether a pattern emerges when the 
trades are grouped by type of institution initiating the trade. That is, we test whether a 
buy (sell) trade executed by a particular type of institutional investor can be 
considered good (bad) news and thus be associated with positive (negative) abnormal 
returns due to the (loss of) expected effectiveness of monitoring in driving the firm to 
better performance. We, thus, split our sample into seven categories of institutional 
investors and compute for each the abnormal returns around the buy and sell trades. 
Table 3, Panel D presents the results for trades undertaken by fund managers, 
the most active investor category in our sample. For the buy trades, the results are 
similar to those reported in Panel C: Fund managers buy large stakes after significant 
stock price decline (CAR-40,-2 = -11.39%) and these trades result in significant positive 
abnormal returns in the event period (CAR-1,+1 = 1.17%) and in the post event period 
(CAR+2,+40 = 2.33%). These results are also similar to the buy trades undertaken by 
insurance companies (Panel E) and Investment Trusts (Panel F). Overall, the results 
indicate that these three large institutional investors which account for 62% of the 
total trades (see Table 2) display similar trading patterns and market reaction: they 
buy after significant price decline and their large trades provide positive information.  
For small trades, the trading of fund managers results in CAR-40,-2 of 6.67% 
and the CAR+2,+40 of -1.98% which are both statistically significant but the event date 
abnormal returns (CAR-1,+1) are not significant. These results indicate that the fund 
managers that undertake the small trades are market followers but the market reverts 
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after the trade. The results for insurance companies and investment trusts are mixed. 
Overall, these results are not consistent with the information signalling hypothesis. 
In the case of the sell trades, the small and large transactions are undertaken 
after significant price run up. However, the large sell trades undertaken by fund 
managers result in negative event date abnormal returns of -0.83% and post-event 
abnormal returns of -1.99%. In contrast, small trades result in positive announcement 
date abnormal returns of 0.42% and insignificant returns in the post-event period. 
These results indicate that small trades are likely to be undertaken for liquidity 
considerations while large sell trades are strategic decisions to reduce significantly the 
holding in the company. Our findings provide further support for the information 
content of large sell trades undertaken by fund managers. The results for insurance 
companies and investment trusts are not consistent with the information hypothesis. 
The remaining investors do not appear to have a significant effect on the 
equilibrium share prices when they trade. Overseas institutional investors (Panel G) 
buy and sell after large price declines but in the post-event period the CARs are 
negative particularly for both large buy and sell trades. Banks (Panel H) sell small 
stakes after price run-up and the CAR+2,+40 amount to -7.85% and significant. They 
sell large stakes in companies that have already underperformed (CAR-40,-2 = -2.56%) 
and this underperformance extends beyond their trading date (CAR+2,+40 = -3.37%). 
For industrial and commercial companies, the market reaction on the announcement 
date of purchases of large stakes is positive, probably in expectation of a takeover bid, 
but the pre- and post-event periods abnormal returns are not statistically significant. 
Finally, for pension funds, the CAR+2,+40 after small buy trades are negative and 
significant. Their large buy trades are undertaken after significant price run-up and 
they are followed by significant positive abnormal returns in the post-event period 
(CAR+2,+40 = 4.24%). In contrast, their sell trades are not followed by significant 
negative returns, and the event date abnormal returns of 1.25% are positive and 
significant.  
Overall, the information hypothesis appears to be supported mainly by the 
large buy and sell trades undertaken by fund managers. The large trades undertaken 
by the remaining institutional investors are not fully consistent with the information 
hypothesis or only one direction of the trade provides support for this hypothesis, and 
this direction is not always the buy trades, as shown in previous studies. For small 
trades, the results provide a weak support for the information content hypothesis.  
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F.  Are the results sample-period dependent?  
In this section we test whether our results are affected by the changes in the 
publication rules that occurred during our sample period and whether they hold in 
bullish and bearish periods. Over our sample period a number of reforms in the 
publication rules came into effect in the London Stock Exchange. We have taken the 
announcement dates as the dates when companies report the trades in the RNS. The 
London Stock Exchange rules require companies to report any such trades without 
delay. However, the traders may have up to 5 days to report to the company their 
trades. In order to assess whether such potential delay affects our results, we split the 
data into 2 periods according to the trade delay rules’ change dates.11 Period 1 relates 
to the pre-13 December 1993, when the maximum allowable delay is 90 minutes for 
trades larger than 3 times Normal Market Size (NMS), that is the individual stock’s 
typical trade size. Period 2 spans from 13 December 1993 onwards, where the 
maximum allowable delay is 5 days for trades larger than 75 times NMS.  
We find that in Period 1 both buys and sells behave in a similar way before the 
announcement date. After the announcement of the trade, buys continue to yield 
positive abnormal returns, whereas for sells, we find a downward price pressure. 
However, the abnormal returns over the event window (-1, +1) are not significant. 
These results are likely to be driven by the relatively smaller number of observations 
in this first period (11% of the total number of observations). The results for the 
second period resemble those reported in Table 3, even when the event period is 
defined as [-5, +1]. Overall, consistent with Gemmill (1996), we find no evidence that 
changes in trade publication rules affect the market response to buy and sell trades.12  
We also check whether our results are sample period dependent. 
Chiyachantana et al (2004) argue that the behaviour of the suppliers of liquidity is 
likely to depend on market conditions. In particular, in bullish markets, they run up 
prices in the face of a strong buying interest but they do not push down the prices as 
much when they face a selling interest because they are not so cautious about the 
institutional sell orders. The situation is the opposite in bearish markets because many 
traders are willing to sell at the prevailing prices but fewer traders are willing to buy. 
Thus, in bearish markets many institutions can buy shares without paying a large 
liquidity premium while, they will be forced to offer bigger price discounts to find 
buyers for their sell trades. They predict that in bullish (bearish) markets, buys (sells) 
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have a bigger price impact. They find that the price impact is higher for institutional 
purchases in 1997/98 (bullish) but in 2001 (bearish market) institutional sell orders 
had a bigger price impact. They conclude that the price impact of institutional trades 
is not driven by private information but by the payment of a higher premium for 
liquidity when they trade on the same side of the market.  
This hypothesis is tested by tentatively splitting our sample period into 1993-
1996, the relatively bearish period, and 1997-1999, the bullish period. We find similar 
trends for the large buy and sell trades in both sub-periods: large buy (sell) trades are 
preceded by strong negative (positive) returns and followed by positive (negative) 
returns. However, the magnitude of the abnormal returns in the pre- and post-event 
periods and on the announcement dates differs across the two periods. In the first 
period, the price impact on the announcement date is slightly smaller for large buy 
trades (0.40% vs. 0.74% in the second sub-period) but higher, although not 
significant, for the large sell trades (0.14% vs. 0.07%). The differences in means 
between the two sub-periods are not statistically significant. Similarly, we find some 
differences between the two sub-periods in the pre- and post-event abnormal returns, 
but they are not significant. These results are likely to be due to the fact that, although 
in 1997-1999 the market was bullish, the first period is not totally bearish. Additional 
data in the post-2000 period will be more appropriate to test this hypothesis.  
G. Regression results 
In this section we conduct a regression analysis by taking into account other 
variables identified in the prior empirical research to potentially have an impact on the 
abnormal returns. We adopt a similar approach to that used by Chan and Lakonishok 
(1993, 1995), and include variables to accommodate in the model the influence of 
firm size, trade difficulty and identity of trader. We also include variables to account 
for stock and market volatility effects, following Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001). We, 
therefore, construct the following regression model: 
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where CARi,t is the cumulative abnormal return of large trades for the (-40,-2), 
(-1,+1) and (+2,+40) event windows. The explanatory variables are Oi, the new 
ownership percentage, that is, the percentage of shares of the firm held by the trading 
institution as a result of the trade; Sij is a dummy variable for the trade’s classification 
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by market capitalization corresponding to the quartiles of the distribution of value of 
outstanding equity at the prior year-end; Cij is a dummy variable for the trade’s 
classification by complexity as measured by the quintiles of the distribution of normal 
volume computed as average daily volume over a prior 40-day interval, following 
Chan and Lakonishok (1993), Iij is a dummy variable for the type of Institution; Mij is 
a dummy variable for market volatility; Vij is a dummy variable for stock volatility. 
There are five classifications by stock and market volatility, corresponding to the 
quintiles of the distribution of stock’s and market’s average squared daily return over 
the prior 60 trading days (computed following Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001)). We 
run separate regressions for large buy and large sell trades. 
Table 4, Panel A, reports the results of the full model for each of the three 
CAR measures for both buy and sell trades. We find that for the pre-trade period, the 
coefficients of the new ownership percentage variable are negative for both buy and 
sell trades. However, around the announcement day of the trade and the post-trade 
period, there is a positive association between the market reaction and the new 
ownership level for buy trades, while there is a negative association for sell trades. 
The results for firm size and trade complexity are generally consistent with Chan and 
Lakonishok (1993, 1995).    
These findings provide some support to the information hypothesis. Even after 
taking into account firm size, trade complexity, type of trading institution, and 
volatility effects, as the new ownership level achieved as a result of the buy trade 
increases, markets interpret this as good news and react positively. In this case, the 
information conveyed to the market could be that, by the sheer size of the funds 
invested, the institutional buyer is expected to monitor and lead the firm to better 
performance. We can rule out the possibility that short-run liquidity effects could be 
driving these results, since they are accounted for by including the volatility dummies 
in the model. In contrast, markets react negatively to announcements involving lower 
levels of remaining ownership as a result of the sell trade. The information now 
signaled to the market could be that, the institutional shareholder has chosen not to 
monitor and decided to dispose of some or all of its holdings in the firm.13  
Another finding reported in Panel A is the difference in the market response to 
trading by different types of institutions. For the buy trades, the coefficients of the 
fund managers and investment trusts are negatively and significantly related to the 
pre-announcement abnormal returns, but then become positive and significant when 
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the dependent variable is the announcement and post-announcement abnormal returns. 
For the remaining institutional investors, the impact is mainly observed in the post-
announcement period, with the exception of pension funds, the industrial and 
commercial companies and overseas investors where the coefficients are negative and 
significant. For the sell trades, the coefficients of fund managers, investment trusts, 
pension funds and banks are negatively related to the post-event period abnormal 
returns. In the pre-announcement period and on the announcement dates, the level of 
significance is weak. Overall, the results for different types of institutions are mixed. 
We could be missing out important detail by aggregating the trades into institutional 
investor types. Further tests using alternative classifications based on investment 
styles and views on activism are necessary but beyond the scope of this study.   
Table 4, Panel B, assesses the marginal explanatory power of the dummy 
variables, by excluding each set, one at a time, from the full model (1). We report the 
adjusted R2 and F-values for each specification. A great deal of the explanatory power 
is lost when we exclude stock volatility effects. However, consistent with Chan and 
Lakonishok (1993, 1995), excluding the dummy variables for firm size and trade 
complexity has little effect on the R2. The type of institution behind the trade has 
some effect but marginal. Chan and Lakonishok (1993, 1995) find strong institutional 
effect, probably because they are able to include into the model the effect of each 
money manager in isolation by using 36 dummy variables, one for each money 
manager, in their sample. However, in our study we were unable to include in the 
model a dummy variable for each of our 1,504 trading institutions and our best 
available option was to group them into institutional types. Although the overall effect 
of the identity of the trader is small compared to the other sets of dummies, there are 
significant differences among different types of institutions, as reported in Panel A. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
V. Conclusions 
We use a unique dataset to analyse the market reaction to the arrival of news 
regarding block trades undertaken by institutional investors in the UK from 1993 to 
1999. We test the asymmetric price response hypothesis and investigate whether the 
market response to the information signaled by the trades depends on the type of 
institutional investor initializing the trade. We find limited support for this hypothesis 
for the sample as a whole and when confounding events are excluded. We find that 
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the type of investors behind the trade and the combination of the size of the trade and 
the trader’s resulting level of ownership, are the major determinants of the price 
impact. In particular, the large buy and sell trades undertaken by fund managers, the 
most active investors in our sample, have strong information content, while for the 
remaining institutional traders, the results provide a limited support for the 
information content of the trades and for the asymmetry between price impacts of buy 
and sell orders. We also show that fund managers adopt contrarian strategies as they 
sell on a price rise and buy on a price decline and, as suggested by Brennan and Cao 
(1996), these active investors are likely to be informed traders. Similar results are 
found for the large buy trades of insurance companies and investment trusts. The 
trades undertaken by the remaining investors appear to be randomly distributed.  
The regression results also provide some support for the information 
hypothesis. After including firm size, trade complexity, type of trading institution, and 
volatility effects in the regression model, the new ownership level achieved as a result 
of the buy trade increases the abnormal returns suggesting that the market is 
interpreting this as good news, probably because the institutional buyer is expected to 
monitor and lead the firm to better performance. In contrast, the market reacts 
negatively to the announcements involving lower levels of remaining ownership 
resulting from the sell trade. The information now signaled to the market could be 
that, the institutional shareholder has chosen not to monitor and decided to dispose of 
some or all of its holdings in the firm. 
These results, however, call for more research to understand fully the price 
impact of institutional trades. In particular, we find that the market reaction on the 
announcement date of the large sell trades is not negative for the institutional 
investors other than fund managers, suggesting that share prices rebound rapidly after 
a sell trade is announced or that the suppliers of liquidity are not pushing prices down 
when they face a selling interest as the market was bullish over our sample period. 
These results could also be due to the specific data we used. Our announcement dates 
are based on the company disclosures of the trades. We assume that the market gets 
the information when the company discloses the trade in the RNS. We believe that 
such announcements are likely to convey more information because when trades are 
executed, especially if they are in small amounts, their information content will not be 
observed, while, when companies make the announcement in the RNS, the market 
gets informed about the identity of the trader, the amount traded and the new holding. 
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Although companies have to disclose these trades to the market without delay, they 
may get the information up to five days after the trade. The trades that are executed in 
small amounts but reported to the company as one aggregated trade will result in one 
single announcement. Since, as shown in our results, the market appears to react more 
to the large trades, the traders are likely to avoid aggregating their trades and make a 
single announcement to the companies to mitigate the information effect. Thus, they 
are likely to opt for an execution of the trades in small blocks to minimize the 
information effects and report multiple trades individually to the company. This is 
likely to be the case for the sell trades and the resulting non-negative abnormal returns 
on the announcement date. Our data does not allow us to analyse this issue further and 
the disclosure of the trades is an interesting empirical issue for further research.  
The analysis of the pre- and post-event abnormal returns indicates that the 
possibility of multiple executions of block trades is not likely to affect substantially 
our results. If the block trades are executed in small trades but reported to the 
company as one aggregated trade, we would expect positive abnormal returns before 
the buy trades and negative abnormal returns before the sell transactions. We did not 
find any significant daily abnormal returns 10 days before our event date. In addition, 
if the trading has started during days -40 to -2, we would expect CAR-40,-2 of the buy 
trades to be positive and CAR-40,-2 of the sell transactions to be negative. The results 
reported in Table 3 indicate that CAR-40,-2 of the buy trades are mainly negative while 
CAR-40,-2 of the sell trades are mainly positive.  
Our analysis could also be expanded to cover further the characteristics of the 
investors. The data does not provide any information on the institutions’ affinity or 
tendency to monitoring or whether these trades are done for their own account or on 
behalf of clients. It would be interesting to analyse the impact of the investment styles 
(indexed, value, growth, diversified), portfolio turnover rates and separate dummy 
variables to identify the effect of each individual trader. Given the large number of 
institutional investors in our sample (1,504), it was not possible to include these 
effects in our study. Finally, there is a need to test further the impact of macro 
economic effects by using data the post 1999 period when the market is bearish. The 
extent to which all these factors will support or alter our conclusions is a matter of 
further research. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics  
The table presents the descriptive statistics of the proportion of shares traded, their value, the size of 
companies and the proportion of ownership following the trade. The sample includes all institutional 
trades with complete data undertaken in the London Stock Exchange (LSE) from 1993 to 1999 as 
reported in the Regulatory News Service (RNS).  Panel A. includes all the trades. Panel B. reports the 
buy trades and Panel C. the sell trades. 
Mean Min 25th 
percentile
Median 75th 
percentile 
Max 
Panel A. All Trades (n=19,166) 
      
% of share capital traded 2.72% 0.01% 0.44% 1.21% 3.62% 68.71%
% of shares held after the trade 9.98% 0.00% 4.70% 8.16% 14.52% 92.08%
Market Capitalization (₤ million) 739.2 0.036 44 160 592 62,276 
Value of the trade (₤ million) 14.76 0.001 0.36 1.32 5.28 5,537 
      
Panel B. Buys (n=9,843) 
      
% of share capital traded 2.36% 2.72% 0.47% 1.15% 2.36% 68.71%
% of shares held after the trade 12.13% 0.64% 6.08% 10.90% 15.91% 92.08%
Market Capitalization (₤ million) 726 0.036 46 162 600 55,745 
Value of the trade (₤ million) 12.96 0.00001 0.36 1.2 4.92 4,025 
       
Panel C. Sales (n=9,323) 
      
% of share capital traded 3.10% 0.01% 0.41% 1.33% 4.08% 68.71%
% of shares held after the trade 7.72% 0.00% 0.00% 5.74% 13.01% 87.28%
Market Capitalization (₤ million) 753.6 0.036 43 158 584 62,276 
Value of the trade (₤ million) 16.56 0.00002 0.36 1.44 5.88 5,537 
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Table 2. Distribution of trades by trade size and investor category 
The table reports the distribution of the size of the trades by institutional investor. The 
sample comprises all trading activity (with complete data) in the London Stock 
Exchange (LSE) from 1993 to end of 1999 as reported to the Regulatory News 
Service (RNS). ICCs is for industrial and commercial companies. Other financial 
institutions include life assurance companies, charities, trusts and foundations, joint 
and nominee accounts, other financial institutions and groups, venture capital 
companies, and the public sector. Panel A. includes all the trades. Panel B. reports the 
buy trades and Panel C. the sell trades. 
 
% of share capital traded (S) S< 3% %5%3 <≤ S  %10%5 <≤ S
 
%15%10 <≤ S
 
%20%15 <≤ S
 
S≥20% Total 
Panel A. All trades 
Fund Managers 
Insurance Companies 
Overseas Institutions 
Banks 
ICCs 
Investment Trusts 
Pension Funds 
All Other Institutions 
 
Total 
 
5,885 
2,356 
1,827 
841 
718 
639 
427 
1,474 
 
14,168 
 
690 
741 
271 
239 
115 
198 
220 
410 
 
2,884 
 
401 
128 
112 
73 
60 
67 
63 
128 
 
1,032 
 
530 
19 
31 
102 
20 
15 
8 
109 
 
834 
 
113 
3 
6 
12 
8 
1 
3 
13 
 
159 
 
37 
0 
24 
3 
10 
2 
3 
10 
 
89 
 
7,656 
3,247 
2,271 
1,270 
932 
922 
724 
2,144 
 
19,166 
 
Panel B. Buy trades 
Fund Managers 
Insurance Companies 
Overseas Institutions 
Banks 
ICCs 
Investment Trusts 
Pension Funds 
All Other Institutions 
 
Total 
 
3,300 
1,230 
1,173 
393 
501 
440 
206 
807 
 
8,050 
 
268 
197 
89 
64 
42 
56 
53 
118 
 
887 
 
203 
59 
48 
32 
19 
21 
21 
59 
 
462 
 
201 
5 
16 
42 
5 
5 
2 
48 
 
324 
 
57 
1 
3 
6 
3 
1 
1 
6 
 
78 
 
14 
0 
13 
3 
4 
1 
2 
5 
 
42 
 
4,043 
1,492 
1,342 
540 
574 
524 
285 
1,043 
 
9,843 
 
Panel C. Sell trades 
Fund Managers 
Insurance Companies 
Overseas Institutions 
Banks 
ICCs 
Investment Trusts 
Pension Funds 
All Other Institutions 
 
Total 
 
2,585 
1,126 
654 
448 
218 
199 
221 
667 
 
6,118 
 
422 
544 
182 
175 
73 
142 
167 
292 
 
1,997 
 
198 
69 
64 
41 
41 
46 
42 
69 
 
570 
 
329 
14 
15 
60 
15 
10 
6 
61 
 
510 
 
56 
2 
3 
6 
5 
0 
2 
7 
 
81 
 
23 
0 
11 
0 
6 
1 
1 
5 
 
47 
 
3,613 
1,755 
929 
730 
358 
398 
439 
1,101 
 
9,323 
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Table 3. Cumulative Abnormal Returns Classified by Size and Identity of Traders 
The sample includes all institutional trades with complete data undertaken in the London Stock Exchange (LSE) from 1993 to 1999 as reported 
in the Regulatory News Services (RNS). Returns are calculated using OLS market model with Scholes and Williams (1977) adjustment. Day 0 is 
the announcement day of the trade. Samples in Panels C to J exclude confounding trading events and companies without data on resulting 
ownership. In Panel C to J, small (large) refers to trades after which the % of shares held in the company by the trader is in the bottom (top) 
group. ***, **, * are significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 Buy Trades Sell Trades 
 N CAR–40,-2 CAR-1,+1 CAR+2,+40 N CAR–40,-2 CAR-1,+1 CAR+2,+40 
Panel A. All Events N = 19,166 
% 
t-test Buy – Sell 
9,843 -0.41*** 
-11.43*** 
0.65*** 
-5.72*** 
0.20 
-1.08 
9,323 3.03*** 0.30** 0.11 
Panel B. Non Confounding Trading Events N = 13,498 
% 
t-test Buy – Sell 
6,886 -1.16*** 
-8.59*** 
0.48*** 
5.66*** 
-0.70*** 
-0.64 
6,612 1.69*** 0.09 -0.49** 
Panel C. Size of New Ownership Groups 
Small 
Large 
t-test Small – Large
t Buy – Sell(Small)
t Buy – Sell(Large)
1,519 
1,520 
2.86*** 
-6.22*** 
10.68*** 
-3.39*** 
-8.51*** 
0.16*** 
1.14*** 
-4.80*** 
-1.24 
3.58*** 
-2.12*** 
1.53*** 
-5.39*** 
-3.21*** 
3.86*** 
1,448 
1,449 
4.65*** 
1.61*** 
2.85*** 
0.44* 
0.21 
0.88 
0.33 
-1.50** 
2.68*** 
Panel D. Fund Managers 
Small 628 6.67*** 0.02 -1.98** 579 7.22*** 0.42*** 0.59 
Large 629 -11.39*** 1.17*** 2.33** 580 2.70*** -0.83*** -2.39*** 
t-test of difference  9.93*** -2.50*** -2.75***  2.00*** 2.74*** 1.91** 
Panel E. Insurance Companies 
Small 287 0.82 0.11 -1.76** 320 3.08*** 0.08 4.60*** 
Large 287 -2.93*** 0.96** 2.92** 320 4.94*** 1.12*** 1.55 
t-test of difference  1.72* -1.76* -2.36***  0.83 -1.54 0.48 
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Table 3. Cont.         
 Buy Trades Sell Trades 
 N CAR–40,-2 CAR-1,+1   CAR+2,+40 N CAR–40,-2 CAR-1,+1 CAR+2,+40 
Panel F. Investment Trusts 
Small 100 -1.14* 0.29 1.28 80 9.78*** 2.03*** -0.64 
Large 100 -4.44*** 2.20*** 4.21*** 80 1.28 1.79** -0.61 
t-test of difference  0.83 -1.55 -0.67  1.51 0.17 0.00 
Panel G. Overseas Institutional Investors 
Small 239 -3.02*** 0.48 -1.74** 173 -1.85 0.53 0.23 
Large 240 -6.28*** 0.44 -3.06*** 173 -6.02*** 0.98* -3.98*** 
t-test of difference  1.09 -0.30 -0.20  1.14 -0.34 1.15 
Panel H. Banks 
Small 101 5.88*** 0.78 0.59 143 4.78*** 0.13 -7.85*** 
Large 101 0.49 0.02 1.87 143 -2.56* -0.19 -3.37*** 
t-test of difference  1.37 0.70 -0.37  2.01** 0.50 -1.68* 
Panel I. Industrial and Commercial Companies 
Small 112 1.10 0.53 -6.35*** 66 4.98*** 0.46 -2.29** 
Large 112 1.21 3.59*** -0.61 66 4.24*** 0.49 -0.07 
t-test of difference  -0.04 -2.45*** 1.96**  0.10 -0.02 -0.35 
Panel J. Pension Funds 
Small 52 0.72 -1.55 -10.24*** 88 1.09* 0.80 -0.58 
Large 52 5.69*** -0.19 4.24** 88 2.33** 1.25* -0.73 
t-test of difference  -0.60 -1.01 -2.16**  -0.36 -0.34 0.05 
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Table 4. Regression results 
The table reports the regression estimates using the following model: 
i
j
ijVj
j
ijMj
j
ijIj
j
ijCj
j
ijSjtiOtiCAR εψλϕγδβα +∑=
+∑
=
+∑
=
+∑
=
+∑
=
++= 4
1
4
1
7
1
4
1
3
1
,,  
where CARi is the cumulated abnormal return (in %) for the (-40,-2), (-1,+1) and (+2,+40) event windows. Oi is the new 
ownership percentage, that is, the percentage of shares of the firm held by the trading institution as a result of the trade; Sij is a 
dummy variable for the trade’s classification by market capitalisation corresponding to the quartiles of the distribution of value 
of outstanding equity at the prior year-end of sample firms; Cij is a dummy variable for the trade`s classification by complexity 
corresponding to the quintiles of the distribution of normal volume computed as average daily volume over a prior 40-day 
interval (following Chan and Lakonishok (1993)); Iij is a dummy variable for the type of Institution; Mij is a dummy variable 
for market volatility effects; Vij is a dummy variable for stock volatility effects. There are five classifications by stock and 
market volatility, corresponding to the quintiles of the distribution of stock’s and market’s average squared daily return over 
the prior 60 trading days (computed following Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001)). The equation is estimated separately for sell 
and for buy trades. The sample includes all institutional trades in the LSE from 1993 to 1999 as reported on the Regulatory 
News Service. ***, **, * are significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
 Buy Trades Sell Trades 
 CAR–40,-2 CAR-1,+1 CAR+2,+40 CAR–40,-2 CAR-1,+1 CAR+2,+40 
Panel A: Estimated coefficients for full model 
Intercept 
New Ownership Percentage 
Size 2 (small) 
       3 
       4 (large) 
Complexity 2 (easy) 
                 3 
                 4 
                 5 (hard) 
Trader 
   Fund Manager 
   Investment Trust 
   Pension Fund 
   Insurance Company 
   Bank 
   Industrial & Commercial Co. 
   Overseas Investor 
Market Volatility 2 (low) 
                        3 
                        4 
                        5 (high) 
Stock Volatility  2 (low) 
                        3 
                        4 
                        5 (high) 
 
0.032 
-0.206 
-0.006 
0.006 
0.028 
-0.004 
-0.011 
-0.014 
-0.017 
 
-0.023 
-0.018 
0.009 
-0.002 
0.023 
-0.004 
-0.006 
-0.025 
-0.016 
-0.031 
-0.090 
0.010 
0.019 
0.031 
0.080 
 
*** 
*** 
 
 
*** 
 
 
* 
** 
 
** 
* 
 
 
* 
 
 
*** 
** 
*** 
*** 
 
*** 
*** 
*** 
 
-0.002
0.017
-0.006
-0.007
-0.001
0.005
0.000
0.000
0.005
 
0.009
0.007
0.001
0.005
0.002
0.006
0.002
-0.004
0.000
-0.001
-0.005
0.001
0.005
0.006
0.016
 
 
** 
***
***
 
** 
 
 
* 
 
** 
** 
 
* 
 
* 
 
* 
 
 
***
 
** 
***
***
 
0.037
0.056
-0.028
-0.022
0.004
-0.002
-0.024
-0.008
-0.020
 
0.022
0.023
-0.029
0.020
0.034
-0.029
-0.016
0.001
-0.013
-0.036
-0.024
0.007
0.014
0.005
0.048
 
*** 
** 
*** 
*** 
 
 
*** 
 
*** 
 
* 
* 
* 
* 
** 
* 
* 
 
** 
*** 
*** 
 
** 
 
*** 
 
0.006 
-0.230
0.030 
0.065 
0.047 
-0.017
-0.001
-0.012
-0.037
 
0.017 
0.002 
-0.018
-0.011
-0.026
-0.022
-0.049
-0.010
0.001 
-0.018
-0.082
0.011 
0.029 
0.060 
0.157 
 
 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
** 
 
 
*** 
 
 
 
 
 
** 
 
*** 
 
 
** 
*** 
 
*** 
*** 
*** 
 
0.000 
-0.007 
-0.007 
-0.012 
-0.008 
0.005 
0.002 
0.006 
0.004 
 
-0.001 
0.006 
0.001 
-0.001 
-0.004 
-0.001 
0.000 
0.001 
0.005 
0.001 
0.001 
0.001 
0.002 
0.007 
0.017 
 
 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
** 
 
*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
** 
 
 
 
 
*** 
*** 
 
0.011
-0.101
-0.022
-0.016
-0.010
-0.011
-0.012
-0.025
-0.024
 
-0.011
-0.029
-0.014
0.013
-0.024
0.014
-0.012
0.020
0.012
-0.005
0.016
0.005
0.007
0.010
0.058
 
 
*** 
*** 
* 
 
 
* 
*** 
*** 
 
* 
** 
* 
* 
** 
* 
 
*** 
* 
 
** 
 
 
 
*** 
 
Panel B: Adjusted R2 (%) and F-values (in parentheses) for full model and models with each set of dummy variables 
excluded one set at a time (p-values for all models are significant at the 1% level) 
Full Model 
Excl. trader effects 
Excl. size effects 
Excl. complexity effects 
Excl. market volatility effects 
Excl. stock volatility effects 
 
4.80 
4.72 
4.63 
4.78 
2.44 
2.44 
 
(19.9)
(27.5)
(21.8)
(23.6)
(12.5)
(12.4)
 
1.56 
1.55 
1.36 
1.44 
1.46 
0.70 
 
(7.1)
(9.6)
(7.0)
(7.8)
(7.9)
(4.3)
 
2.89 
2.77 
2.41 
2.69 
2.28 
2.08 
 
(12.2)
(16.4)
(11.7)
(13.6)
(11.6)
(10.8)
 
8.98 
8.14 
8.34 
8.72 
7.13 
2.56 
 
(35.4) 
(45.4) 
(37.5) 
(41.4) 
(33.6) 
(12.3) 
 
1.98 
2.00 
1.64 
1.92 
1.93 
0.89 
 
(8.2)
(11.2)
(7.9)
(9.6)
(9.6)
(5.0)
 
3.20 
2.87 
2.99 
3.06 
2.98 
1.81 
 
(12.8)
(16.0)
(13.6)
(14.6)
(14.2)
(9.0) 
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Appendix  
The London Stock Exchange 
The London Stock Exchange has a number of features that differentiates it from the 
other International Exchanges. This section attempts to summarise some of these features that 
may be relevant within the context of this study. 
A  Characteristics 
After the ‘Big Bang’ in October 1986, several important changes have occurred in the 
London Stock Exchange (LSE). One of these changes has been the introduction of a system 
whereby competing market makers sustain a continuous presence in the market and act as 
counter party to equity transactions. This represents a substantial move towards a more order-
driven system. 
The LSE also has a policy of ensuring the proper checks and controls are in place in 
order to protect investors, while at same time trying to avoid making these rules and 
regulations so rigid that it may scare-off companies who want to achieve a listing14.  
According to Board and Sutcliffe (1995), the ability and the relative ease of institutional 
investors in buying and selling large blocks of shares in a single transaction is actually one of 
the factors that bring a competitive advantage to the LSE when compared with other stock 
exchanges. They explain that this system requires the market makers to take quite substantial 
inventory positions, which increases the risk that they are subjected to. Therefore, market 
makers demand protection against this additional inventory risk.  Protection can take several 
forms some of which can be delaying the publication of a large trade or the development of 
Inter Dealer Broker Systems (IDB) which provides a private, order–driven method by 
matching buys and sells and allowing the surplus to be traded among the other market makers.  
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B  Delayed Publication 
Despite the obvious advantage of offering protection to market makers, delayed 
publication can in fact be detrimental to the transparency of the market due to the information 
asymmetries that arise among the market participants.  
Since the Big Bang the delayed publication policies for unusually large trades at the 
LSE have changed quite a bit. Prior to January 1991, although the volume of trades was 
published immediately, the publication of prices could be delayed for up to 24 hours for alpha 
stocks over £100,000 and 3 minutes for all other trades. From 14 January 1991, the 
publication of price and volume for trades larger than 3 times Normal Market Size (NMS) 
could be delayed for up to 90 minutes, while the delay allowed for all other trades remained 
the same. On 13December 1993, an additional delay was allowed on top of the previously 
prevailing level and the market makers could choose to delay publication of trades larger than 
75 times NMS from 90 minutes to 5 business days, or until 90% of the position has been 
unwound, whichever is sooner.  
On 1 January 1996, in a move towards increasing the transparency of the market, the 
delayed publication of trades between 3 and 6 times NMS was abolished. Also, all IDB trades 
now had to be published with a delay of at most 3 minutes. Additionally, the delay period for 
trades greater than 75 times NMS was brought down from 90 minutes to 60 minutes (the 
minimum requirement). 
Board and Sutcliffe (2000) report that the value of all trading subject to publication 
delay has decreased by 43% after the delayed publication changes in 1996. In addition, they 
find a 75% jump in the proportion of trading published immediately. They conclude that we 
can now expect to see the information effects of trades between 3-6 times NMS swiftly 
compounded in the stock prices.   
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C  Disclosure Requirements 
On 18 September 1993, amendments, affecting both listed and unlisted companies, to 
the Companies Act (1985) (CA85) came into force in order to reflect the influence of the EU 
Transparency Directive 88/627/EEC. The regulations apply only to share capital with voting 
rights intact and require that any equity stake of at least 3% in a public company or an equity 
stake that no longer exceeds this threshold must be communicated to the company in the form 
of a written notification within two days of the change. Hence, the 3% level is termed as the 
‘notifiable interest’ level. Any increase or decrease in the stake (above the 3% threshold) that 
causes the total to move up or down to the next percentage point necessitates a new 
notification. The company then needs to make appropriate changes to its share register within 
a period of 3 days subsequent to the date of receipt of the notification. Additionally, listed 
companies are required to inform the Company Announcements Office (CAO) of the London 
Stock Exchange as soon as they receive such notification. The information reported to the 
CAO needs to contain, among other details of the change in shareholding, the date of receipt 
of the notification and, if known, the date of the transaction. However, any interest and 
change in interest of the executive and non-executive members of the board of directors has to 
be reported to the CAO with the date of the disclosure as well as the date of the transaction. 
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Notes 
                                                 
1 The permanent effect depends on the size of the block (Mikkelson and Partch (1985)). 
2 Following Maug (1998), the word “monitoring” encompasses all value enhancing activities, 
including intervention and shareholder activism, in company’s operations and information 
acquisition to pinpoint possible problem areas that may need intervention. The corporate 
governance literature views the purchases of blocks of shares as a route to monitoring. (See 
Holderness (Forthcoming) for a review). The trend in monitoring has been observed in the 
1990s when activist investors such as large pension funds, money managers and individual 
investors purchased blocks of shares to exert influence over company policies (Wahal (1996)) 
and previous studies report that the rise of block share purchases lead to operational, financial 
and governance changes in corporations, and resulted in a decline in hostile takeovers as a 
means of disciplining managers (Maug (1998), Bethel, Liebeskind and Opler (1998)).  
3 Theoretical models of monitoring are provided by Admati, Pfleiderer and Zechner (1994), 
Maug (1998) and Kahn and Winton (1998). 
4  Our sample is relatively smaller than US studies. For example, Conrad, Johnson and Wahal 
(2002) use 1.63m orders with an average number of trades of 1.97 per order in the calendar 
year 2000. Their data came from a consulting firm that monitors the costs of institutional 
trading. In the UK there are also many trades per day and per company. For example, 
Gemmill (1996) uses a sample of 3,010 buy and 2,977 sell trades in 26 of the largest 
companies on the London Stock Exchange in May of each year 1987-1992. His high-
frequency data is from the London Stock Exchange tapes. We were unable to get this type of 
private data. Instead, we rely on the actual trades reported by companies in our sample in the 
Regulatory News Service. This procedure has limited the number of trades in our sample and 
has resulted in relatively larger trades. It is possible that the trades in our sample are 
undertaken in small parts over many trades. However, we were unable to estimate the order 
break-up as in Chan and Lakonishok (1995) or Keim and Madhavan (1995, 1997).  
5 We identify separately each institution because of the issues raised in previous studies on the 
execution costs in various stock markets (e.g., Chan and Lakonishok (1997)), their trading 
practices and strategies (e.g., Brennan and Cao (1996), Badrinath and Wahal (2002), 
Goetzmann and Massa (2002), Huang and Masulis (2003), and Griffin, Harris and Topaloglu 
(2003)), their activism (e.g., Wahal (1996), Bethel et al. (1998), Faccio and Lasfer (2000)) 
and the determinants of their trading activity (e.g., Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001)). 
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6 Similarly, there is no evidence that the size of the trades differs strongly across years in the 
sample period. For example, the average trade size ranges between 2.39% in 1999, and 3.72% 
in 1994, and the medians are 1.12% in 1999, and 1.70% in 1993. The average value of the 
trade ranges between £11.4m in 1999, and £17.2m in 1995. The median values range between 
£1.1m in 1994-1995 and 1997-1998, and £1.3m in 1993. 
7 This category represents the internally managed funds. Part of the trading of other 
institutional investors such as fund managers is likely to be undertaken on behalf of pension 
funds. However, we were unable to identify this proportion. 
8 They define a buy trade package as successive purchases of the same stock by the same 
money manager with a break of less than 5 days in between the individual trades and the 
event dates they use are based on actual trade dates. However, in our sample, day 0 
corresponds to the announcement day, which can be up to 5 days after the trade took place, 
due to the legal notification period allowed for shareholders to inform the company of the 
trade. If the exact trade date is known, these results might resemble each other even more.  
9 The results are checked for robustness by excluding all other news items, such as earnings, 
mergers and acquisitions, corporate reorganisation and capital changes, announced by the 
companies in the sample over the [-10, +10] window. This screening reduced the sample to 
13,282 events. The overall results, not reported for space considerations, are similar to those 
reported in Panel B. 
10 A brief description of the disclosure requirements in the LSE, which forms a basis for our 
choice of 3% is in the Appendix, Section C.  
11 The data on NMS is not available to split the two period. See appendix for details. 
12 These results are not reported for space considerations. We have also analysed the daily 
abnormal returns of the sell trades from day -10 to day -2 to check further whether the 
positive abnormal returns of the sell trades are due to the fact that companies announce the 
transaction in the RNS five days after the trade is completed, as stipulated in the publication 
rules. We find that none of the daily abnormal returns are negative and significant. 
13 We expect the information conveyed to the market by an ‘exit’ trade to be very different 
from a trade that is simply carried out for portfolio rebalancing purposes. Our data does not 
allow us to split directly the trades into portfolio rebalancing and strategic trading purposes. 
However, since these trades are mainly large and result in large changes in ownership, they 
are unlikely to be for liquidity purposes. 
14 Nicola Humpage, London Stock Exchange at the Expo’99, 23 November 1999, London. 
